> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.infraredtrading.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.infraredtrading.com/learn/protocols/velodrome/security.md). # Security Velodrome/Aerodrome security posture — audit history, incident record (all frontend/DNS or opsec to date, no AMM-contract exploit), and trust boundaries. Trust model in one line: the AMM contracts are minimal, immutable clones with a strong record — **every realized incident to date has been at the frontend/DNS or team-opsec layer, never an AMM contract exploit** — while the live risk knobs (fees, swap pauses, gauge kills) sit with the team multisig and an emergency council. Mechanics: [Mechanics](/learn/protocols/velodrome/mechanics.md). Role holders: [Deployments](/learn/protocols/velodrome/deployments.md). ## Audits * **Velodrome v1 — Code4rena contest (May 23–30, 2022).** 82 wardens; 6 high- and 17 medium-severity findings over 17 contracts / \~3.4k LOC, pre-launch. [Report](https://code4rena.com/reports/2022-05-velodrome) * **Velodrome V2 — Spearbit security review** (engaged Feb 2023; completed 2023-06-16, report published 2023-07-17). 119 findings: 1 critical (fixed), 8 high (all fixed), 19 medium (16 fixed / 3 acknowledged), plus low/informational. This is the audit covering the v2 Pool/Router/PoolFees/ve system that Aerodrome forked. The Spearbit GitHub portfolio was restructured and no longer hosts the report PDF; the live engagement listing is the [Cantina Spearbit portfolio](https://cantina.xyz/portfolio?section=spearbit-guild) (Velodrome Finance V2 review, Feb 2023). Finding counts above are as read from the report while it was accessible. * **Aerodrome** launched (Aug 2023) on the audited Velodrome V2 codebase. No separate published audit dedicated to the Aerodrome fork-diff has been located; the diff from Velodrome V2 is small (naming, the `MAX_FEE` constant, no V1-migration surface), but "fully audited as deployed" should not be assumed without checking the teams' current security pages. * **Slipstream + Universal Router — Spearbit security review (Nov 20 – Dec 5, 2023).** Slipstream is a fork of audited Uniswap V3 core/periphery with modifications (dynamic fees, staked-liquidity accounting). A dedicated Spearbit engagement covered three repos — `velodrome-finance/contracts`, `velodrome-finance/slipstream`, and `velodrome-finance/universal-router` — with 49 findings: **6 high (all fixed)**, 6 medium (4 fixed / 2 acknowledged), 18 low (13 fixed / 5 acknowledged), 10 informational (8 fixed / 2 acknowledged), and 9 gas. [Cantina portfolio page](https://cantina.xyz/portfolio/dee3928c-2a74-46ec-a89b-baf0d61fba9b) * **Velodrome Superchain — ChainSecurity audits.** ChainSecurity audited Velodrome's [Superchain Slipstream extension](https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/velodrome-superchain-slipstream) (cross-chain CL gauge accounting, address-collision analysis) and its [Superchain interoperability module](https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/velodrome-superchain-interoperability) (multi-chain state consistency, Hyperlane integration, frontrunning resistance). Both audit pages report a high level of security with the raised issues addressed. Scope is the cross-chain interop layer, not the v2 basic-pool or standard Slipstream contracts. * **Pool Launcher — MixBytes security audit (Sep 12 – Oct 3, 2025).** MixBytes audited the Pool Launcher system (14 contracts, \~800 lines of Solidity — V2PoolLauncher, CLPoolLauncher, V2Locker, CLLocker, and associated factories) that underlies the Aero Ignition token-launch mechanism: **0 critical / 0 high / 1 medium / 12 low**, with the codebase described as "well-structured with no significant vulnerabilities." Deployed Nov 10, 2025. [Audit repo](https://github.com/mixbytes/audits_public/tree/master/Velodrome/Pool%20Launcher) * **Aero (METADEX03) pre-launch audits — in progress (2026).** The official Aero site article ["Aero is on the Horizon"](https://aero.xyz/articles/aero-is-on-the-horizon/) (2026-07-16) confirms private security reviews of the Aero codebase by **ChainSecurity and Sherlock**, led by Riley Holterhus, plus an additional Mythos-powered review, with the final audit round running through August 21, 2026, and a **$400K public audit contest on Sherlock August 24 – September 11, 2026** ahead of the September 2026 launch. The article's statement that "across three audit teams, no critical or high vulnerabilities have been found" is a **project self-report made mid-engagement**, not an auditor publication — as of 2026-08-21 no Aero audit report has been published by ChainSecurity or Sherlock, so finding counts and severities should not be treated as established until the auditors' own reports appear. * **Bug bounty:** Velodrome runs a live [Immunefi program](https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/velodromefinance/); both brands maintain official `/security` pages with current bounty terms. ## Incidents * **Aug 2022 — insider theft from an ops wallet (\~$350K; fully recovered).** A team member with shared access to Velodrome's operating-costs wallet drained it; the person was identified by internal investigation, funds were recovered, and key access was moved to Gnosis Safes. Team opsec, not a contract or user-fund event. * **Nov 28–29, 2023 — frontend DNS hijack (both brands).** A social-engineered takeover of the domain-registrar account (2FA bypassed, nameservers changed) pointed velodrome.finance / aerodrome.finance at wallet-drainer phishing. The teams' [official incident report](https://medium.com/@VelodromeFi/11-29-2023-incident-report-92865dceb757) states **\~$250K of user losses** (superseding earlier lower news estimates); a second, quickly-mitigated attack followed Dec 1. The protocols directed users to decentralized frontends. **Contracts unaffected.** * **Nov 21–22, 2025 — frontend DNS hijack recurrence (both brands).** Press coverage of the teams' postmortem attributes it to a compromise at the NameSilo registrar with DNSSEC removed and the domains redirected; reported user losses range from \~$700K to over $1M depending on the estimate. **Contracts again unaffected.** [The Block](https://www.theblock.co/post/265104/velodrome-aerodrome-hit-by-attack-on-front-end-websites) * **No AMM-contract exploit** of Velodrome v1/v2, Aerodrome, or Slipstream pool contracts has been publicly reported to date. The repeat DNS pattern makes **frontend provenance** the realized user-risk surface: contract-level integrations have never been affected, while anything that scrapes or deep-links the protocols' web UIs inherits the DNS risk. ## Trust boundaries and risks * **Admin-parameter risk (live).** The `feeManager` can set any pool's fee up to the cap (3% on Base) at any time, and swap pausing is a unilateral team-multisig power. Neither can touch reserves or LP redemption — `burn` has no pause and no admin path ([Mechanics](/learn/protocols/velodrome/mechanics.md)). Fee changes silently change swap-quote correctness for anyone caching fees; read `getFee` live. * **Emergency Council (gauge layer).** Can kill gauges — which stops emissions to a pool and historically precedes liquidity leaving it — but cannot halt swaps or withdrawals on the pool itself. * **Immutability as containment.** Pools are non-upgradeable EIP-1167 clones; a malicious governance action cannot retroactively change deployed pool code. The upgrade path is new factories plus voluntary migration, which shifts the risk to **liquidity fragmentation** (multiple live factory generations — already true for Slipstream) rather than code substitution. * **Stable-pool curve risk.** The `x³y + xy³` curve assumes the pair trades near peg; in a depeg (e.g. a stablecoin failure) the pool drains almost entirely into the failing asset, so a stable-LP position's value collapses toward the bad asset. This is inherent Solidly-family behavior, not a bug. * **First-deposit / donation edges.** `MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY` (1e3 dead shares minted to `address(1)`) and the stable-pool `MINIMUM_K` guard the classic inflation attacks; direct token donations to a pool inflate `burn` output relative to cached reserves until synced (benign for holders, relevant to exact valuation). * **Merger-window risk (2026).** The Aero migration (new token, new factories, mandatory emissions migration) is the largest change-control event in the protocols' history; contract sets and liquidity locations are actively moving through the Aero launch window, now targeted for September 2026 — see [Ecosystem](/learn/protocols/velodrome/ecosystem.md). --- # Agent Instructions This documentation is published with GitBook. GitBook is the documentation platform designed so that both humans and AI agents can read, navigate, and reason over technical content effectively. 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